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Police command and control centres are the main point of contact for the public who require help. Like other
areas of UK public services, police forces are set targets for their performance. Some of these targets relate to
the speed at which they respond to calls for assistance from the public. In this paper we share our experience
in improving the performance of command and control centres of a UK Police Force; a project which started
as a classical simulation exercise and ended up with a significant reorganization in a UK Police Force.
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Introduction
The work described here is based on a consultancy project
conducted by a Lancaster University team for a large UK
police service serving an urban area of about 500 square miles.
The force in question, though fully cooperative in the conduct
and implementation of this work, prefers to remain anony-
mous and so is named, hereon, as The Police Force (TPF).
TPF receives approximately 2 million incoming calls every
year and makes about 800 000 outgoing calls. The incoming
calls show significant within-day and within-week variations.
TPF initiated the work because it was failing to meet targets
for responses to requests for assistance from the public. People
who requested help in emergencies were waiting too long
for their phone calls to be answered, the comparative perfor-
mance on non-emergency calls was also poor and there was
concern over the time taken to get police resources to inci-
dents when that was necessary. Not only were these aspects of
performance unsatisfactory, TPF was incurring large overtime
bills that were thought to be excessive. Not unreasonably, the
senior officers and staff of TPF wanted to explore different
options for improvement and, having heard about computer
simulation, they requested help.
Before starting to explore options for improvement, TPF
officers and staff sensibly wished to start by developing their
understanding of the current situation through the construction
and use of an ‘as-is’ simulation model of its operations. This
then served as the springboard for modified models that were
used to explore different options for change. This exploration
required a mixture of simulation modelling skills, detective
work and a willingness to engage directly with police oper-
ations. This was only possible due to the close cooperation
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between the Lancaster team and the officers and staff of TPF.
As a result of the project, TPF is planning the reorganization
of the way in which it handles calls from the public and how
it organizes its response by committing police resources.
Real-life work of this type is always messy and any descrip-
tion is likely to provide a rather sanitised and, possibly heroic,
view of what happened. Various writers suggest how a simu-
lation project should be planned and managed. Examples
include Robinson (2004), Banks et al (2001) and Law (2007).
Here we use the suggestions found in Pidd (2004, Chapter 3),
for the obvious reason that Pidd is one of the authors of this
paper. This account suggests that simulation projects require
analysts to operate in two parallel domains (see Figure 1). The
first is the technical domain, in which the team must abstract
and simplify the operations of interest so as to develop and use
a computer simulation model. The other is the organizational
domain in which the project must be managed properly so as
to gain the required insights in an appropriate timescale. The
serial nature of text makes it very hard to convey the parallel
nature of such activity but, where appropriate, reference will
be made to both legs of Figure 1. The next section begins
with the problem structuring necessary to gain some under-
standing of TPF operations and processes, together with an
appreciation of likely options for change and improvement.
Problem structuring and conceptual modelling
Problem structuring
The term ‘problem structuring’ seems to be used in two
distinct ways: as an end itself or as a preliminary to modelling.
Writers such as Rosenhead and Mingers (2001) use ‘problem
structuring’ as an end itself and contrast this with problem
solving. The latter term carries the idea that problems can be
solved and there seems little doubt that this is true, at least
temporarily, in many situations. However, there exist ‘wicked
problems’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) that probably cannot be
solved but of which increased understanding may be gained
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Figure 1 Simulation project domains (Reproduced from Pidd
(2004) with permission).
and this may provide enough clarity for appropriate action to
be agreed and taken. That is, wicked problems are not solved
but may be structured, so as to allow progress. As used here,
however, the term ‘problem structuring’ refers to processes
by which the analysts gain a sufficient appreciation of the
presenting problem and its context so as to enable modelling
and analysis to proceed. Different approaches to this form of
problem structuring are discussed in Pidd and Woolley (1980).
As understood here, problem structuring is a form of sense-
making in which analysts, clients and other stakeholders
explore and learn about a presenting situation so as to gain
joint understanding. The approaches discussed in Rosenhead
and Mingers (2001) can be used; for example, Kotiadis
(2006) discusses the use of soft systems methodology in
developing a conceptual model in a simulation of a health
care system but they are not always necessary. Sometimes, all
that is needed is a willingness to get to grips with the systems
of interest so as to appreciate the appropriate simplifications
that will enable modelling to proceed. During this process,
the problem structuring morphs into conceptual modelling,
in which a software independent representation is developed.
Robinson (2006) argues that ‘conceptual modelling is prob-
ably the most important aspect in the process of developing
and using simulation models’. That is, an unhelpful concep-
tualization can lead to misunderstanding and much wasted
effort in a simulation project. Though a conceptual model
should be software independent, in most cases the analyst
knows what software will be used and will accommodate
aspects of the conceptual model to suit this. In this project,
TPF wished to use Micro Saint Sharp, which focuses on
entities passing through a task network. Hence the concep-
tual model adopts a similar view of the interactions that take
place in the system.
Though modern computer simulation software certainly
supports rapid model development and testing, it would be
a mistake to assume that this always leads to short, sharp
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Figure 2 Current CaRC operations; call handling (front end) and
radio operations (back end).
by magic. Successful work depends on the close cooperation
of the analyst team and the client. In this, we were very fortu-
nate, since the member of TPF staff who provided liaison
was very astute and realized that success would depend on
mutual understanding. This combined with the determina-
tion of TPF to find way to improve its performance whilst
containing costs, provided a very congenial atmosphere in
which the main issues could be teased out.
TPF contact and response centres
At the time of the study, telephone contact between the
public and TPF was handled by four Contact and Response
Centres (CaRCs). Each CaRC had two main functions: call
handling, which is the responsibility of the call takers and
force dispatching, for which radio operators are responsible.
That is, it became clear that the operation of a CaRC could
be separated into two parts (see Figure 2) and this realization
determined the structure of the conceptual model.
1. The front end: which, in the main, acted like a conventional
call centre by taking calls from the public, offering advice
and noting details of the call, including its urgency.
2. The back end: in which radio operators took graded call
information prepared by the call-takers (see below) and
committed appropriate police resources. In the case of
chases and continuing incidents, radio operators might be
involved with a particular incident over several hours.
In the front end operation, calls from land-lines were routed
on a geographic basis to the nearest CaRC, which would
also dispatch police resources if these were needed. However,
if the call-takers were busy, calls would be re-routed to an
alternative CaRC via an Automatic Call Distributor (ACD).
The call-takers dealt with two broad types of call: emergen-
cies (known as 999s in the UK) and nonemergencies. If a
member of the public dialled 999, their call was immediately
answered by a British Telecom (BT) operator, whose main
job was to determine which emergency service is required. If
the caller needed police assistance, the call was forwarded to
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Table 1 Call grading at TPF
Call grade Dispatch target
Immediate response Attendance within 10 min of call receipt
Priority response Attendance within 1 h of call receipt
Prompt response Attendance within 4 h of call receipt
Referred response Referred to division for appropriate resolution
Telephone resolution of the call Achieved by successful and appropriate first time telephone resolution
the appropriate CaRC. To discourage the use of 999 for none-
mergency calls, TPF widely advertised an alternative Single
Non-Emergency Number (SNEN). SNEN calls came direct
to the TPF switchboard which, if appropriate, forwarded the
call to an appropriate CaRC.
Since TPF wished to respond fastest to the most urgent
calls for help, it employed a call-grading system that was
applied to all calls, whether 999s or SNENs. The call-taker
receiving the call would evaluate the situation, using a stan-
dard protocol, and assign a grade (see Table 1) to the incident
reported by the caller. The first three grades generally required
police resources to be deployed that day, whereas lower two
grades of call were transferred to other sub-divisions in TPF
for forms of resolution not requiring deployment of physical
police resources. Table 1 also shows TPF’s dispatch targets,
and this reveals that, for instance, grade 1 calls required
them to attend the incident with 10 min of the radio operator
dispatching resources. In a crowded urban area, this can be
a challenging target to meet. Given the need for such rapid
responses, resources were distributed geographically around
the TPF area.
In addition to receiving and responding to incoming calls
from the public, the CaRCs also involve the call handlers
and other staff making outgoing calls, which may be a suit-
able response to some incoming calls. Records showed that
outgoing calls represented about 40% of all calls passing
through the CaRCs. The effect of the outgoing calls is to
reduce the time available for handling incoming calls. Figures
2 and 3 are simplified and do not show the outgoing calls.
At the end of each simulated incoming call, a proportion of
calls generate an outgoing call on which a call-taker is then
engaged for a further period.
In the front-end operations of a CaRC, call-takers graded
each call to produce an Incident Report (IR) by typing appro-
priate information into a pro-forma while speaking to the
caller and would complete the IR immediately after the end of
the call. The support software entered the IRs into a database
and then ensured that a summary of the IR appeared on
the screen of a radio operator working in the back-end of the
CaRC. The radio operators viewed the IRs on their screens and
prioritized them by their call grade, dispatching appropriate
resources. On some occasions, the radio operators, assisted
by their supervisors, had to further prioritize calls for two
reasons. First, there might be several IRs with the same call
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Figure 3 Proposed CaRC front end operations (showing 4
CaRCs).
Table 2 Emergency and non-emergency calls have different
performance targets
Call type Performance indicator Target (%)
Emergency Percentages of calls
answered in 15 s
90
Non-emergency Percentages of calls
answered in 30 s
90
need specific resources (eg a helicopter). The increasing use of
mobile phones led to many incidents being reported through
multiple calls from several members of the public at or near
the site of incident. Hence, the radio operators strove to avoid
duplication and a supervisor might need to determine that
several calls refer to the same incident.
Table 2 shows the performance targets for the CaRCs at
the time of the study. The targets were local, that is, they
were set by TPF itself, though they were based on sugges-
tions from external bodies. When the study began, not only
was TPF not meeting its own targets, but it was likely to
perform even worse against more stringent national targets
that were thought to be in the offing.
Modelling of CaRC operations
The front end operations of a CaRC are, in effect, a special-
ized call centre and call centres have been widely studied.
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Gans et al (2003), for example, provides a very thorough
review of the operation of many types of call centre and
discusses different approaches to their improvement. Since
call patterns often follow non-stationary distributions and
there is a need to model complex shift patterns, discrete-event
simulation (DES) is a commonly used approach in planning
and improving their operations (Avramidis and L’Ecuyer,
2005; Mehrotra and Fama, 2003). Within the police domain,
some of the earliest such work is reported by Kolesar et al
(1976), who worked with the 911 emergency phone system
of New York City. This describes the combined use of a
model based on queuing theory and a simulation, in which
the latter was used to validate the queuing model. In a similar
vein, Kuhn and Hoey (1987) report on work commissioned
to improve the performance of Washington D.C. police
call handling. Their approach included a simulation of call
handling operations.
As is clear from Kolesar et al (1976) and from Gans et al
(2003), analytical models of aspects of call centre operations
are often used for planning shift patterns. Many of these
models are based on M/M/N (Erlang C) queuing assumptions
and divide the non-stationary patterns into relatively stationary
short periods (eg of 30 min) that might correspond to inter-
vals on a shift pattern. However, such models do not allow
for callers who renege or balk after calling and are known
not to cope well with systems that are occasionally highly
congested. Taking a different tack, Chassioti and Worthington
(2004) proposes the use of discrete time approximations that
cope with non-stationary demand and also allow the use of
realistic service time distributions.
Unlike the front-end operations, there have been very few
OR&MS studies of response and resource despatch (back-
end operation) and even fewer accounts of DES applications.
Green and Kolesar (2004) addresses most of the issues
involving police response and resource despatch and gives a
short history of OR/MS work on emergency responsiveness.
Larson (1973) is an early report of the use of a simula-
tion model for urban police patrol and dispatching that was
implemented in a number of large cities in the USA. Written
around the same time, Ignall et al (1974) discusses both a
simple M/M/c queuing model and a simulation approach
for police patrol deployment. Published a few years later,
Bohigian (1977) summarizes some of the simulation work in
criminal justices, including police patrol and communication.
In another early paper, Colton (1979) sets modelling work
in a broader context and reports a survey on the usage of
computer technology by the US police departments. Colton
reports that 18% of the police departments surveyed indi-
cated that they used analytical models to help improve their
operations.
It is clear, then, that both front and back end operations
of police response have been studied, though there are more
reports on work attempting the improvement of front end
operations. It is also clear that the front end operations can
be regarded as a specialized call centre.
Our conceptual model
After discussion within our police colleagues we agreed
that the objective of this study was to investigate ways to
improve TPF’s performance in handling emergency and non-
emergency calls from the public. We also agreed to treat the
front and back ends of CaRCs separately. Though each CaRC
housed both front and back end operations, call handlers
did not communicate directly with back end radio operators.
Instead, the radio operators worked through the prioritized
list of IRs that appeared on their screens. The two parts
were linked by the database system into which IRs were
entered and from which they were extracted. The need for
detailed modelling of call handling, including non-stationary
demand distributions, complex shift patterns, call balking and
outgoing calls, led us to develop a simulation model of the
front end operations. We had originally intended to simulate
the back end operations as well; however, it soon became
clear that there was little or no data available on back end
operations. Hence, we focused our efforts on simulating the
front end.
Our conceptual model of the front end is shown in Figure 3,
in which calls arrive from the outside world. Though 999s
were routed via BT operators and SNENs via the switchboard,
performance was measured only at the point when the call is
passed through to the ACD. Each call would be destined for
a particular CaRC, but would be re-routed by the ACD if no
call-taker were available in that CaRC. If no CaRC was able
to accept the call, it would wait in a FIFO queue and the ACD
would poll the CaRCs at frequent intervals until one was able
to accept it. Each CaRC had its own manning levels and so
the number of call-takers would vary across the CaRCs and
through time. There was no evidence of a line shortage, so
the conceptual model assumed that enough line capacity for
incoming and outgoing calls would always be available.
Building the simulation model
The simulation model was implemented in Micro Saint
Sharp (2005) because TPF already had a licence for its use.
Though Micro Saint Sharp allows animation (eg, to show
calls arriving, being answered and leaving), the nature of
the conceptual model meant that such animation added very
little to the simulation and hence the models were developed
and run in network diagram mode. The model network is,
as would be expected from the conceptual model, rather
simple, and a partial network in shown in Figure 4. An oval
represents a task in which resources are needed to change
the state of the call. The small diamonds represents points
where there is more than one route after a task is completed.
The small rectangle attached to a task shows that calls may
be queued before entering the task. A rectangle represents a
subsystem which is drawn as another task network (the task
network inside the rectangle is not shown in Figure 4). Since
the front end operations in each CaRC were conceptually
the same, though the number of calls and call-takers varied,
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Figure 4 Simulation task network.
the actual model includes four replicates of the same CaRC
logic. The call arrival distributions, call duration distributions
and number of call-takers available are all provided as data
via Excel files when the model runs.
The simulation model requires two types of data: the
number of call-takers available at any time and details of
the calls. The TPF phone information system automatically
logged the start and end times of each call and so it was
straightforward to obtain a sample of calls so as to analyse
their statistical properties. In particular, this sample allowed
us to examine the arrival patterns of the calls and their
durations.
Modelling calls
Analysis of the arrival patterns quickly showed that the arrival
rate of calls and, therefore, the intervals between them, varied
during the day and during the week. As discussed earlier,
such non-stationary behaviour is common in call centres and
in police contact centres. In the case of TPF, Figure 5a shows
the typical in-week variation in the number of calls received
at the time of our study, and the typical within-day variation is
shown in Figure 5b. Figure 5a shows the average call volumes
from the data provided from the TPS systems. The highest
call volumes are on Saturdays and Sundays and Figure 5b
clearly shows the evening peaks. The same patterns may not
occur in other police forces since TPF’s area includes several
large urban centres and a police force with different respon-
sibilities is likely to have a rather different call pattern. Anal-
ysis of the data showed that call arrivals could be modelled
as a non-stationary Poisson process. In our simulation model,
each call is separately generated and progressed through the
model. Call generation is implemented by computing Poisson
rates at hourly intervals across a week and modifying these
using a thinning process (Lewis and Shedler, 1979) to reflect
the non-stationarity. Since Micro Saint Sharp uses C# as its
simulation language, it was relatively simple to code this thin-
ning algorithm and the call generation in a re-usable function.
The statistical patterns in the observed call data were used
to build the as-is model and also served as the basis for the
later investigation of questions such as: how many staff will
be needed if call volumes increase each year? We could not
be sure whether the patterns would remain the same and just
scale up if demand increased. However, the ‘what if’ simu-
lations relied on expert opinion within TPF that the patterns
would remain constant, and would scale up as call volumes
increased.
Since each simulated call is separately generated in the
simulation, it is also necessary to simulate the length of time
taken to handle that call. As with call generation, the TPF
information system made this analysis straightforward, since
the duration of each call can be extracted from the system.
In analysing this data it was important to check for the effect
of the time of day and the call grade. It might be the case
















































































Figure 5 Variation in number of calls received. (a) In week
variation and (b) In day variation.
that calls at one time of day take longer than others and it
might be that the call duration varies according to the call
grade. Statistical analysis showed that neither of these effects
was evident and that call durations could be modelled using
lognormal distributions. Analysis of the IRs enabled us to
develop a histogram of different call grades, allowing each call
to be probabilistically given a call grade during a simulation
by taking a sample from that histogram.
Two other aspects of call handling also needed to be
included in the model. The call logs stored in the information
system showed that some callers reneged—that is, they ended
the call before a call-taker was able to answer. There are
many possible reasons for this, including congestion in the
system. Based on the log data, we modelled the reneging
using a staircase function, that is, the longer a person waits,
the more likely it is that the call will be abandoned. Since
there was no evidence of a line shortage, we ignored the issue
of balking. Finally, the log data showed that about 40% of
total calls were outgoing from the CaRCs and this proportion
was applied in the model.
Representing staffing levels
Since one aim of the project was to understand why perfor-
mance against targets was so poor, it was obviously impor-
tant to represent the number of call-takers available at any
time during a simulation. For the as-is model it was impor-
tant that the staffing levels were an accurate representation of
staff availability during the period that the as-is model was
to represent. Were this not so, it would be impossible to have
any confidence in the model, nor could it be used to under-
stand why the actual performance was poor. Unlike call data,
it seemed, initially at least, that staffing information could not
be simply taken from a database and analysed, instead we had
to rely on other records kept by TPF. The shift patterns in
use were based on hourly changes, which allowed this same
interval to be used for the thinning process employed for call
generation in the model.
However, incorporating this hourly staffing data into the
simulation model led to some very puzzling behaviour.
When the model’s performance was compared with the
actual performance for a defined period, there were very
large discrepancies between the two. In particular, the model
showed the average performance to be much better than
it actually had been. Digging deeper into the data, signifi-
cant anomalies became apparent. For example, examination
of the actual performance in the period showed that this
was best when recorded staffing levels, as incorporated into
the model, were at their lowest. For example, the recorded
staffing levels during the last three days of the week were low,
yet the percentage of calls answered within the target time
was high—though there was no evidence of any significant
change in call handling times. This was even more puzzling
when placed against the excessive overtime that was one of
the drivers for the project.
After further investigation it became apparent that there
were two reasons for this. The first was that we had been
given planned staffing numbers and not the actual values.
Absenteeism is a problem in all call centres and answering
emergency calls in a CaRC can be a very stressful job, further
worsening the problem. In addition, further investigation
revealed that the front and back end operations were not quite
as independent as we had thought. At many times of day
there are empty seats in the call-takers’ area, since demand
is expected to be below the maximum. However, the radio
operators who act as dispatchers must always have a full
complement since each is assigned to one or more physical
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geographical areas. If a radio operator is absent from his/her
station, for short periods or an entire shift, an appropriately
trained calltaker will take over the station—depleting the
actual numbers of available call-takers.
Digging deeper, we found that other parts of the information
system did indeed store information about staff availability,
though not in a very convenient form. When a call taker starts
a shift, (s)he must press a button to notify the call distribution
system of their availability. If a call taker needs to take a break
or must take over a radio operator role, (s)he again presses the
availability button to notify the system that their call station
is unmanned. Hence, we dug into the raw information system
data and were able to produce staffing figures that more or less
reflected actual availability—though it could still be subject to
error if a call taker took a break without logging off from the
system. Using this data allowed us to demonstrate that, for the
weeks in question, the model provided a good indication of
the call handling performance of the CaRCs. That the CaRC
supervisors were unable to provide accurate staffing data is
worrying, and suggests that the CaRCs were not very well
managed.
ACD logic
In the as-is model, the ACD plays a very important role in
balancing the workload across the four CaRCs. It checks the
availability of call takers in each CaRC and distributes the
calls accordingly. The ACD would be unnecessary if there
were one single CaRC. As about 15% of calls are re-routed
to a non-geographic CaRC, it was important to capture ACD
logic as accurately as possible. As with the staffing data, this
seemed simple at first, but soon became less clear.
We were first told that the ACD operated with geographic
logic. Thus, if a call arrived at a busy CaRC, it would be
re-routed to the physically closest alternative CaRC. If this
second CaRC was also busy, the call would be further re-
routed to a third CaRC that was the next closest, and so on. If
all CaRCs were busy, then the call would return to the first one
where it would remain in the queue until answered. We built
this logic into the simulation model and discovered that it led
to unexpected results. It produced a situation in which far too
many calls were passed to the first CaRC in the loop; far too
many, that is, compared to the actual data, which showed a
good balance of re-routed calls across all CaRCs. Something
was wrong, though the CaRC supervisors were convinced that
this simple ACD logic was correct.
Modelling the ACD correctly is important, since we wished
to model the different performance of each of the CaRCs so
that, later, we could examine different CaRC configurations
and staffing levels. The ACD swings into action when the
system is congested, which usually occurs at times of high call
volumes, such as night-time at weekends and these are times
when performance is most likely to drop. As with the staffing
data, the CaRC supervisors were curiously ill-informed about
the workings of the ACD.
Further investigation showed that the ACD did not operate
on a geographic basis, but on a ‘free the longest’ basis. That
is, if a call arrived at a congested CaRC, it would be re-routed
to the CaRC for which the interval between the current clock
time and the arrival of the previous call was the longest. This
then left the question of how the ACD knew which CaRC was
busy. Further investigation showed that a CaRC was regarded
by the ACD as not busy if two or more call handlers were
available but not engaged in current calls. On reflection, this
is not sensible, since some CaRC had only two call handlers
on duty during slack periods. A one-free rule would be much
more sensible.
Following our own detective work on the ACD logic, we
were able to correctly model call re-routing and to produce
figures that were close to those observed in real life and to
complete our black-box validation. It was, though, strange that
the CaRC supervisors had no real grasp of the operation of the
ACD. Once the model incorporated the correct staffing levels
and ACD operation, its use showed that, properly managed,
the call taking operation should be able to meet the target
answering times shown in Table 2 without adding extra staff.
The understandable priority given to radio operation was a
concern, though, since it would always make it difficult to
meet the answering targets whenever a radio operator was
absent.
Model validation
As is often the case, model validation proceeded alongside
model development. It is widely recognized that most simula-
tion models cannot be fully validated, in the sense of knowing
that they are a completely adequate representation of some
system. One obvious reason for this is that such models are
often used to investigate possible futures, which do not yet
exist and against which model performance cannot therefore
be compared. Hence, both black-box and white-box valida-
tion (Pidd, 2004) are better regarded as a process of building
confidence that a simulation is appropriate for its intended
use, an issue discussed in Kleindorfer et al (1998). Therefore,
in this project, validation proceeded hand in hand with model
development as call arrivals, call handling, staffing rules and
call hand-off were included in the model.
Thus, the models were gradually refined by adding detail
until they were considered adequate for the project aims—to
understand why performance was poor and to investigate
possible improvements. Figure 6 shows the model output
against actual performance for a two 2-week period, based on
the percentage of calls answered within the specified period.
Initial use of the front end simulation model
With an adequate model of ACD logic in place, the simula-
tion model could mimic the actual operations of the CaRC
front ends. That is, it was regarded as a valid representation
of current operations. This allowed the team to investigate
likely performance under different staffing assumptions.

































Figure 6 Model output versus actual performance over a
two-week period.
These showed that the CaRCs should be able to meet perfor-
mance targets without the excessive staffing levels which, in
prospect, had simulated the simulation project.
Resource deployment—the back end
As discussed earlier, the simulations concentrated on the front
end, in which calls are received, handled by operators, graded
and passed to the back end for attention, which might include
resource deployment. The CaRCs had existed for about 10
years and had replaced a set of control rooms owned by each
division of TPF. Since resources had, 10 years earlier, been
owned by each division, this meant that the control rooms
operated as command and control centres. However, the areas
covered by each division were rather small and this led to
constant problems, such as those caused when police officers
were absent. Hence the CaRC system had four large centres
and aimed to integrate call handling and resource dispatch.
Since we had a good understanding of the call handling oper-
ations and had created a front end simulation model, we
decided to investigate resource deployment and so had two
OR postgraduate students spend time in the divisions and on
patrol with police officers.
Radio operators
It soon became clear that the CaRCs had very little real control
over resource deployment. In effect, the CaRC radio opera-
tors requested resources and the subdivisions decided what
to do. Within this, the police officers on the beat had consid-
erable discretion as to which calls to respond to in which
sequence. That is, much of their work was fairly loosely,
unsupervised. Thankfully, ‘Immediate Response’ calls were
always given priority, but lower grade calls might be processed
in any convenient sequence—this might actually be sensible,
since the officers may have local knowledge. Owing to this
locally exercised discretion, it was almost impossible for the
radio operators to meet the response targets shown in Table 1









Figure 7 Possible new organizations. (a) Current organization
and (b) Proposed 2-ECC organization.
since they could not control resource deployment. This, of
course, raised the question of whether the attempt to integrate
call handling and resource dispatch within the CaRC system
made sense. If resource control was exercised by the subdivi-
sions and divisions, perhaps the radio operators should be co-
located with these resources. Since all contact between call
handlers and radio operators in the CaRCs was via database
records, perhaps the CaRCs should be replaced by call centres,
linked electronically to local Control Centres in sub-divisions?
That is, a system very different from the current CaRCs
might be preferable. This could consist of one (or two, for
resilience) call centres—if more than one, any ACD should
not operate geographically, but should merely aim to see
calls answered as quickly as possible. If radio operators
were no longer collocated, there was less opportunity for
borrowing call takers as stand in operators. Admittedly, this
would require better control of radio operator staffing, but
this was likely to be a good thing. Hence, we proposed an
alternative organization of front and back end operations to
TPF and this is discussed below.
What-if modelling
Conceptual models: alternative organization
Thinking at a conceptual level, it seemed clear to us from
queuing theory and intuition that operating with a single queue
and multiple servers would lead to better performance than
having a queue for each server. In terms of the Emergency
Call Centres (ECCs: CaRCs with radio operations removed)
this suggested, as mentioned above, an end to geographic call
distribution. TPF agreed with this view but needed evidence
from which to mount a case for the large capital expendi-
ture that would be needed. Hence, models were needed that
represented different ways of organizing the ECC opera-
tions to allow performance comparison. Broadly speaking,
this required the development of two variations on the
simulation.
1. Current: The as-is model of a system with geographic call
distribution, four integrated CaRCs and call queues before
each CaRC.
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Table 3 2-ECC option outperforms 4 CaRCs option
999s SNENs
4 CaRCs (%) 2-ECC (%) 4 CaRCs (%) 2-ECC
Average (%) 94 99 86 99.8
Best weekly (%) 98 100 93 100
Worst weekly (%) 86 97 72 99
Standard deviation (%) 3 1 5 0.3
Table 4 2-ECC option under increasing call duration
999s SNENs
Call duration (%) +10% +20% +10% +20%
Average (%) 97 95 99 98
Best weekly (%) 99 99 99.8 99.7
Worst weekly (%) 91 87 97 95
Standard deviation (%) 2 3 0.6 1
2. Proposed: An alternative system with 2 or 4 ECCs and a
single queue, with dispatch and response devolved to sub-
divisions. This would allow local control of resources.
Figure 7 shows the essential difference between a 4 CARC
and a 2-ECC organization: clearly an organization based on
4 ECCs would show 4 ECCs rather than 2. In addition, some
callers may renege if the system is too busy and waiting time
becomes excessive. In the as-is model (4 CaRCs), the ACD is
geographic. In the alternative 2-ECC and 4-ECC models, the
ACD logic is simple. Calls enter a single queue and the ACD
routes a call to the ECC with the first available call taker,
which leads to a balanced workload. Under such a system,
TPF would operate what is effectively a single ‘virtual’ call
centre.
Experiments and output analysis
The main objective of the experimentation was to evaluate
whether the proposed call management system (a ‘virtual call
centre’) would perform better than the current system of four
geographic CaRCs. As expected, the experiments showed
that the proposed system should outperform the current
system and that there was very little performance difference
between 2 or 4 ECCs. Since simulation of the 2 and 4-ECC
options showed very little difference in their performance,
the following discussion concentrates solely on the 2-ECC
option.
Following this result, we conducted sensitivity analyses to
evaluate the effect of different call durations and call volumes
on performance. Table 3 shows the percentage of calls handled
within the target times based on current call volumes over a
12-month (52 weeks) period. This indicates the performance
of the current system of 4 CaRCs against the 2-ECC option
and it is clear that the proposed 2-ECC model consistently
outperforms the current 4 CaRC model. Our analysis shows
that the weekly performance could be increased by up to 11
and 27%, and annual performance to 5 and 14%, for emer-
gency and non-emergency calls, respectively.
Having established that the performance of 2- and 4-ECC
virtual call centres were similar and would outperform the
current 4 CaRC system at current call volumes, we next inves-
tigated the performance of a 2-ECC system against tighter
targets, longer call durations and increased call volumes.
TPF were keen in see how the new system would perform
against new, tighter targets that they thought might be
suggested by the Home Office, which includes police forces
in its responsibilities. In the UK, each government depart-
ment negotiates Public Service Agreements (PSAs) with
the Treasury. These specify, among other things, perfor-
mance targets for the department in question, in return for
the budget that it is granted. Thus, the PSA for the Home
Office included targets for reduced crime and increased
public confidence. These national targets cascaded down to
individual police forces and it seemed likely that targets for
call handling would be introduce in the future. Hence, TPF
wished to know what staffing levels would be needed in a
2- or 4-ECC system to meet these targets for current call
volumes. Hence, we investigated the model performance with
tighter targets of answering 90% of 999s within 10 s (reduced
from 15 s) and SNENs within 20 s (reduced from 30 s). The
experiments showed that the proposed ECC systems should
be able to meet the more stringent targets with no increase
in staffing.
The next experiment aimed to anticipate the effects of the
National Incident Recording Standards and National Crime
Recording Standards. These were intended to improve quality
of information received and recorded by police forces and
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were likely to increase the average call duration. As expected,
the increase in call duration reduces the call handling perfor-
mance (see Table 4). However, the experiments showed that
the ECC-based systems should be able to meet current perfor-
mance targets with increased call durations for both 999s and
SNENs. There experiments show that there are likely to be
occasional performance breaches at times of peak demand,
but overall performance is still well above the annual targets.
The same results are also observed for the non-emergency
calls. Finally, any reorganization of the 4 CaRCs into 2 or 4
ECCs with dispatch devolved to sub-divisions will be expen-
sive and will need to provide robust performance even if
call volumes increase. Hence, in the final experiments, we
increased call volumes by 2% pa (as specified by the Home
Office) for the next 15 years. In this scenario, current call dura-
tions and current performance targets were used. As would
be expected, performance declines year by year as the call
volumes increase at an annual compound rate of 2%. Similar
results are observed for non-emergency calls.
For the first 10 years, it seems that an ECC-based system
would meet current average performance targets on an annual
basis. Thereafter, staffing levels would need to be increased.
However, there are some concerns behind this seemingly rosy
fac¸ade. First, if performance is measured on a weekly or
monthly basis, there will be increasingly frequent breaches
of the performance targets—over the year, the slack periods
compensate for busy periods. Secondly, it is important to
consider the working conditions of the call takers. As time
proceeds, the call-taker utilizations increase and, by year
10, they would be continuously busy for several hours. It
seems likely that such busyness would affect performance and
could lead to problems with increased absenteeism. Hence, we
might reasonably expect worse performance than suggested
by the simulation analysis.
We have not examined whether staffing would be adequate
if caller demand and call duration both increased at the same
time. It seems likely that staffing levels would be under pres-
sure rather sooner than 10 years under such a combined
scenario.
Summary and future work
Our work with TPF demonstrates the value of close co-
operation between the client (TPF) and the analyst group
(Lancaster). As mentioned earlier, we were very fortunate to
have a member of TPF staff acting as liaison in an extremely
effective way. He was trusted by the police officers and also
by the Lancaster team. This enabled the work to proceed as
a fascinating combination of analysis and detective work.
Without the careful construction and use of simulation
models and their use for analysis, hunches about current
performance and alternative configurations would not have
been tested. Thus, the careful analysis added much value
to TPF’s investigation of its CaRCs. In addition, though,
some fascinating detective work was needed to establish
the limited control actually exercised by radio operators
over police resources, to get hold of actual staffing level for
model validation, to establish the actual ACD logic and to
understand the ways in which radio operations interfered
with call handling.
The simulations show that, properly managed, even the
current CaRCs should be able to meet current performance
call handling targets with current staffing, but this will only be
true if staff are properly managed. Scrapping geographic call
distribution should lead to performance improvements that
should be robust against increased call volumes or increased
call durations or tighter targets. TPF were not interested in
experiments that combined these three effects, though it would
probably have been wise to conduct them. Our analysis shows
that the proposed reorganization structure, having a 2-ECC
system, should perform better than the current system. The
sensitivity analysis also shows that it can meet tighter targets
to anticipate the national targets which will be introduced in
the near future.
We did not attempt to simulate the back-end operations,
though it seems that a significant benefit might accrue from
doing so. Members of the public expect more than a good
call handling operation from TPF but also a good response
and despatch operation. Once this responsibility is devolved
to sub-divisions, then it will be important to establish staffing
levels that will support a good service to the public. As well
as modelling individual sub-divisions, it may be important
to consider their interaction and cooperation since overall
staffing levels may be higher if this is not done. All experi-
enced operational researchers know that focusing only on one
side of a system may switch the pressure elsewhere and it is
important to ensure that meeting call handling targets does
not lead to a failure to meet response targets.
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